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THE COST OF A COUNTERMEASURE: THE EXPANSIVE
LIABILITY PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC READINESS AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2005
Angela Marino
I. INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the anthrax exposures that
followed made bioterrorism and the potential for an epidemic public health
emergency an alarming reality. Following the attacks, President George W.
Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union address, urged Congress to implement
a substantial biodefense strategy, warning that "[i]t would take one vial,
one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like
none we have ever known."' Soon after, the outbreak of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome and avian influenza in Southeast Asia produced real
fears of a global influenza pandemic. 2 President Bush responded by urging
Congress to implement a comprehensive national strategy to prepare for
such a pandemic. 3
J.D. University of Florida, 2009. I dedicate this Note to my family, with gratitude for their
love, wisdom, and eternal support. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the University of
Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy for their guidance and hard work.
1. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003). During the
address, President Bush introduced Project Bioshield, a major research and production effort, and
proposed spending $6 billion to make vaccines and other treatments available against agents like
anthrax, botulinim toxin, Ebola, and the plague. Id.
2. Lawrence K. Altman, US. Issues its FirstPlanforResponding to a FluPandemic,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A20. An influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus emerges,
people have little or no immunity to the virus, and there is no available vaccine for the virus.
PandemicFlu.gov General Information, http://pandemicflu.gov/general (last visited Mar. 6,2009).
During a pandemic, the disease spreads easily from person-to-person, causing serious illness or
death. Id. The disease can spread rapidly through an entire country and even across the world. Id.
3. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response (Nov. 1, 2005).
199
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The president's call to arms raised significant concerns about liability
for pharmaceutical manufacturers.' The federal government readily
recognized the need to encourage pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop
new vaccines and other countermeasures to ensure preparedness in the case
of a public health emergency.5 The government also recognized the reality
that pharmaceutical manufacturers have been universally unwilling to
participate in such endeavors without some form of liability protection.6 in
an effort to address these issues, Congress enacted the Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA) in December 2005.
PREPA provides immunity from tort liability to individuals and entities
involved in the development, distribution, and administration of certain
biodefense and pandemic countermeasures to ensure preparedness in the
case of a public health emergency. However, PREPA extends well beyond
the scope of emergency preparedness and provides unprecedented liability
protection to pharmaceutical manufacturers and other covered entities. Its
provisions afford covered entities immunity from liability under federal
and state law for all claims arising out of the administration or use of a
"covered countermeasure" if the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) declares a public health emergency or
the credible risk of such an emergency.8 The Secretary has the exclusive
authority to determine which products should constitute "covered
countermeasures" and which situations warrant the declaration of a "public
health emergency." 9 These determinations are not subject to judicial
4. Rick Weiss, Bush, Executives Consider Strategies to Ramp Up Vaccine Production;
Spurred by Concern About Avian Flu, Officials Focus on Capacity to Fight PossiblePandemic,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005, at A3.
5. See, e.g., Biodefense: Next Steps: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and
Public Health Preparednessof the S. Comm. on Health, Education,Labor,and Pensions, 109th
Cong. 38-39 (2005) (statement of Anthony Fauci, M.D., Director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases). Dr. Fauci emphasized, "We need to continue to partner with
industry. To think that the government is going to be successful in getting necessary
countermeasures without close collaboration with industry I think is folly. We have to partner very
closely." Id. at 39.
6. See, e.g., Assessing the NationalPandemicFlu PreparednessPlan:HearingBefore the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Pandemic
Flu Preparedness](statement of Michael 0. Leavitt, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services); RoundtableDiscussion: When TerrorStrikes-Preparingan Effective and
Immediate Public Health Response: HearingBefore the S. Comm. On Health, Education,Labor,
and Pensions, 109th Cong. (Errata) 12 (2005) (statement of Tara O'Toole, M.D., M.P.H., Chief
Executive Officer and Director of the Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburg Medical
Center).
7. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 247d-6d to
247d-6e (West Supp. 2007). President Bush signed PREPA into law on December 30, 2005.
President George W. Bush, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(a) (emphasis added).
9. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
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review.'o The sole exception to PREPA's sweeping immunity provisions is
an exclusive federal cause of action against a covered entity for death or
serious injury caused by "willful misconduct,"" a standard of liability far
more stringent than recklessness or any form of negligence.12
PREPA was passed without hearing or debate, quietly tucked into a
military appropriations bill to evade review by members of the HouseSenate conference committee meeting on the bill.13 This evasion of the
legislative process not only brought serious criticism from opponents of
PREPA, 14 but also resulted in a woefully simplistic, one-sided solution to
the liability problem. While readily recognizing the need to provide
liability protection as an incentive for pharmaceutical manufacturers to
develop biodefense and pandemic products, members of Congress failed to
give any meaningful consideration to the need to provide adequate
compensation to those who have been injured by the side effects of such
products.15 Furthermore, by shielding pharmaceutical manufacturers from
civil liability even in instances of gross negligence, Congress failed to
adequately ensure that covered manufacturers will take optimal precautions
in testing and developing their products. 1 6
This Note will argue that while PREPA's extensive liability provisions
are certain to encourage the development of necessary vaccines and other
countermeasures, its provisions do so at a cost to society that is
unwarranted. Part II introduces the liability problem and discusses the
problem in light of the current concerns regarding bioterrorism and the
potential for a public health pandemic. It concludes that strong liability
protections are necessary to ensure the participation of pharmaceutical
manufacturers in the development of biodefense and pandemic
countermeasures. Part III outlines the fundamental elements of PREPA.
Finally, Part IV analyzes two notable shortcomings of PREPA: its
inadequate compensation program and its inability to deter negligent
conduct. Part IV argues that to ensure a successful biodefense strategy,
Congress must reconsider these shortcomings while the threat of a
bioterrorist attack or pandemic influenza is still theoretical.

10. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(7).
11. Id. § 247d-6d(d)(1).
12. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(B).
13. Molly Ivins, Remember FairPlay?Keep a Close Eye on the Government's VariousShell
Games, C. Tam., Mar. 2, 2006, at 19.
14. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. S 14,242-01 (2005) (statements of Sen. Biden and Sen. Clinton).
15. See, e.g., Hearingon PandemicFlu Preparedness,supra note 6, at 50-54 (statement of
Michael 0. Leavitt, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (stating
repeatedly that the legislative proposals as of November 8, 2005 addressed only liability
protection).
16. George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World be a Post-TortWorld?, 112 PENN. ST. L. REv.
175, 228 (2007).
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II. THE LIABILITY PROBLEM
On July 21, 2004, President Bush signed the Project Bioshield Act,
authorizing $5.6 billion in spending to develop new vaccines and other
countermeasures to biological agents.' 7 Despite this seemingly substantial
incentive, pharmaceutical manufacturers were reluctant to enter the
biodefense market. The industry's reluctance became most apparent when,
in early 2004, the federal government sought bids for its first major
biodefense contract, an $887 million agreement to develop and
manufacture a new anthrax vaccine.' The government failed to receive a
single bid from the large pharmaceutical manufacturers.19 The
manufacturers explained their absence by pointing to the large risk of
liability and the limited potential for profit.
The industry's focus on legal liability is well-founded, as products
liability lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers have historically
created inconsistent, threatening legal precedents. 2 1 For example, in 1974,
the decision of Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories held a pharmaceutical
manufacturer strictly liable for failing to issue a proper warning directly to
the ultimate consumer of a vaccine. 22 The Reyes duty was a marked
departure from previous rulings 2 3 and at once became an "unreasonable

17. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the Signing of S.15 - Project
Bioshield Act of 2004 (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/ 2004/07/20040721-2.html).
18. Eric Lipton, Setbacks Stymie Bid to Stockpile BioterrorDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2006, at Al.
19. Id.
20. Id; see alsoBioshieldIl: Responding to an Ever-ChangingThreat:JointHearingBefore
the S. Comm. on the Judiciaryandthe S. Comm. on Health, Education,Labor,and Pensions, 108th
Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Hearingon Bioshieldl] (statement of Christine Grant, Vice President
of Public Policy and Government Relations, Aventis Pasteur) (explaining that the absence of
liability protection was a "major obstacle" that prevented Aventis Pasteur, a leading vaccine
manufacturer, from bidding on the government's anthrax vaccine contract).
21. DIVIsION OF HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 117 (1985).
22. 498 F.2d 1264, 1295 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,419 U.S. 1096 (1974).Reyes involved
an eight-month-old infant who developed polio after taking a Sabin live virus vaccine. Id. at 1270.
The vaccine was administered in a public clinic away from the manufacturer's control, and the
manufacturer had included an adequate written warning with every vial of the vaccine delivered to
the clinic. Id. Nonetheless, a jury found the manufacturer liable for $200,000 for failing to extend
an adequate warning directly to the parents of the eight-month-old infant. See id. at 1269. The
award was upheld by the circuit court. Id. at 1295. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
Wyeth Labs. v. Reyes, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
23. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Legal Concerns and the Influenza Vaccine
Shortage, 294 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1817, 1817 (2005). "Previously, it had been sufficient for
manufacturers to warn health professionals about the risks of vaccines; in the new cases, patients
argued that they should have been warned directly." Id. "To the manufacturers' surprise, the federal
courts were receptive to that theory as applied to mass vaccination programs." Id.
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cost of doing business." 24 Insurance carriers, forced to reassess the risk of
liability, insisted they would have to drop their coverage of certain
pharmaceutical manufacturers.25 The risk of liability exposure and the
difficulty of obtaining insurance coverage caused a mass exodus of
manufacturers from the vaccine market in the 1970s and early 1980s. 26
The additional risks associated with biodefense and emergency
preparedness have further discouraged pharmaceutical manufacturers from
returning to the vaccine market. Under the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations announced in conjunction with the
Project Bioshield Act, bioterrorism defense products may be approved
without completing the full FDA testing and approval process. 27
Additionally, clinical testing of such products on humans may not be
required because of the dangers associated with such testing.28 As a result,
the risks associated with new vaccines and other countermeasures will not
be immediately clear. 29 Side effects and injuries that remain undiscovered
during the limited testing period may become apparent only after use by
the general public.o It is therefore reasonable for pharmaceutical
manufacturers to insist on adequate liability protection before entering the
biodefense market.3 '
24. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, M.D., THE SwINEFLu AFFAIR: DECISIONMAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE 42 (1978).

25. See id. at 51.
26. DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE CHILDREN's VACCINE

INITIATIVE: ACHIEVING THE VISION 106 (Violaine S. Mitchell et al. eds., 1993); DIVISION OF HEALTH
PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 21, at 118. Between
1980 and 1985, 299 lawsuits were filed against pharmaceutical manufacturers producing vaccines
for the U.S. market. Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries:A
Hardy PerennialBlooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 725, 735 (2008). Notably, the
number of pharmaceutical manufacturers producing recommended vaccines for the U.S. market
decreased from more than twenty-five companies in 1973 to only five in 2003. COMMITTEE ON THE
EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES BOARD ON HEALTH CARE
SERVICES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FINANCING VACCINES INTHE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS
AND AVAILABILITY 121 (2003).
27. See Marc Kaufman, BioterrorismResponse Hamperedby Problem ofProfit,WASH. POST,
Aug. 7, 2005, at A5.
28. See Lipton, supra note 18.
29. Michelle M. Mello, Rationalizing Vaccine Injury Compensation, 22 BIOETHICS 32, 36
(2008).
30. Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government's
Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine
Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 7, 31-32 (2005). In addition, because
vaccines are generally administered to healthy people, adverse reactions to vaccines are "far more
noticeable and less tolerated" by persons receiving the vaccine. DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 26, at 106. Pharmaceutical manufacturers will therefore
assess the risks associated with vaccine development differently than they might assess the risks
associated with other pharmaceuticals. Id.
31. Greenberger, supra note 30, at 33. David P. Wright, who has worked for large
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the past and currently serves as the president and chief executive
officer ofPharmAthene, emphasized this point during a Senate committee meeting. Wright argued:
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Furthermore, the biodefense market offers little reward to offset the
considerable risks associated with developing new vaccines and other
countermeasures. 32 Vaccines are not as profitable for pharmaceutical
manufacturers as are other medical products. 33 Thus, participation in the
biodefense market means that large pharmaceutical manufacturers, publicly
held companies that feel pressure from shareholders to make profits, will
have to reallocate their resources and experience a significant opportunity
loss. 34 As stated by former HHS Secretary Michael 0. Leavitt, "We are not
just proposing to fund the industry; we are asking [pharmaceutical
manufacturers] to put up substantial capital. We are asking them to devote
substantial intellectual property. We are asking them to redirect their
priorities to accomplish this task."3 5 The perceived risks associated with
reallocating such resources to the biodefense market clearly outweigh the
perceived benefits. Therefore, it is imperative that the federal government
create incentives to relieve pressure from shareholders and to encoura e
pharmaceutical manufacturers to devote their resources to biodefense.

So there are going to be side effects and there are going to be conditions which
we are not going to know about until these are used in mass populations. And
that liability has to be protected against .. .. [A] major company cannot afford
to bring a product to market with that kind of liability facing them.
RoundtableDiscussion: When TerrorStrikes-Preparingan Effective andImmediatePublicHealth
Response: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Health, Education,Labor, andPensions, 109th Cong.
10 (2005) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion].
32. Terence Chea, Vaccines are Hot Topic, But Not Hot Investment, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13,
2001, at El; Andrew Pollack, DrugMakers Wrestle with World's New Rules; A DelicateBalance:
Patriotismvs. Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 3.
33. David Brown, Severe Vaccine Shortages Termed 'Unprecedented'; Kids' Defenses
Against 8 Diseases Affected, WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 2002, at Al (noting that vaccine development
"isn't viewed as a money-maker" and accounts for only 1.5% of the global pharmaceutical market).
"Among the economic disincentives is the fact that vaccines are given on a rigid schedule and only
occasionally - far different from products such as antidepressants and cholesterol-lowering drugs,
which are taken for years and whose 'target' populations are constantly expanding." Id. See also
Project Bioshield Reauthorization Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Alex M. Azar, Deputy
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("[T]he global market for just one
cholesterol-lowering agent exceeds the global market for all vaccines together, not just those that
comprise a security countermeasure.") (emphasis in original); Chea, supra note 32 ("The drug
industry would rather develop pills that people take every day for years than a vaccine taken once in
a lifetime.").
34. Crossing the Valley of Death: Bringing Promising Medical Countermeasures to
Bioshield: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on BioterrorismandPublicHealth Preparednessofthe S.
Comm. on Health, Education,Labor, andPensions, 109th Cong. 53 (2005) [hereinafter Hearingon
Bringing Medical Countermeasures to Bioshield] (statement of David P. Wright, President and
Chief Executive Officer, PharmAthene).
35. Hearingon Pandemic Flu Preparedness,supra note 6, at 23.
36. Hearing on Bringing Medical Countermeasures to Bioshield, supra note 34, at 34
(statement of Alan P. Timmins, President and Chief Executive Officer, AVI Biopharma, Inc.); see
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The Project Bioshield Act, however, failed to offer such incentives.
Most notably, the legislation failed to provide any form of liability
protection.3 7 As a result, large pharmaceutical manufacturers continued to
view the biodefense market as risky and unappealing.3 8 Notably, in 2000,
the Pentagon's Defense Science Board identified fifty-seven drugs,
diagnostic tools, and vaccines that the United States would need to ensure
a successful response to a bioterrorist attack.3 9 The Board concluded that
only one such resource was available at the time.40 By 2005, only two were
available. 4 1 The industry's reaction to the Project Bioshield Act was
unmistakable, and Congress quickly leamed that strong liability protections
would be necessary to ensure the industry's participation in the biodefense
market.

III. THE ENACTMENT

OF THE PUBLIC READINESS AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS ACT

Congress soon recognized that the Project Bioshield Act was not
sufficient to draw the pharmaceutical industry into the biodefense market.4 2
Accordingly, Congress began discussing new legislative proposals to
address the industry's concerns.4 3 During this time, policymakers and
industry leaders continued to stress the need for adequate liability
protection." Congress responded by enacting PREPA in late 2005.
also Kaufman, supranote 27 (noting that "big drug companies will get involved with vaccines,
antibiotics and other possibly money-losing endeavors only if shareholders can be convinced that
the money will be made up elsewhere").
37. Lipton, supra note 18.
38. Id.
39. Kaufman, supra note 27.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Hearingon BioshieldII,supranote 20, at 2 (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg, Chairman
of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions) ("The concern we have ... is that
since BioShield has passed, we still have a very anemic response within the research communities
and within the production communities to producing these types of vaccines and anti-toxins which
would protect us in the case of an attack. Less than 100 companies have actually come forward and
said that they have an interest in pursuing biologics.").
43. See, e.g., id
44. See, e.g., id. at 19 (statement of Christine Grant, Vice President of Public Policy and
Government Relations, Aventis Pasteur).
[T]he realities of the commercial markets today here and around the world are
that we just can't get commercial liability protection anywhere approaching
reasonable prices. So it is a very, very serious problem. It has a chilling effect
and our companies are watching very closely how liability protection will be
addressed.
Id; Hearingon Pandemic FluPreparedness,supra note 6, at 55 (statement of Michael 0. Leavitt,
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A. Expansive Liability Protection
Under PREPA, covered entities 45 are immune from suit and liability
under both federal and state law for all claims arising out of the
administration or use of a "covered countermeasure" if a declaration has
been issued by the HHS Secretary regarding that countermeasure.4 6 The
Secretary may issue a declaration "if the Secretary makes a determination
that a disease or other health condition or other threat to health constitutes
a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk that the disease,
condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an emergency."' This
vague statutory language grants the Secretary broad discretion to determine
which situations warrant the declaration of a "public health emergency"
and the extension of the statute's liability protection. The Secretary's
determination is not subject to judicial review. 48 Furthermore, once the
Secretary has issued a declaration, the Secretary may not thereafter amend
the declaration to "retroactivelT limit the applicability" of the liability
protection previously extended. 9
The Secretary also has the exclusive authority to determine which
products will constitute "covered countermeasures." 50 A "covered
countermeasure" is broadly defined to include any drug, biological product,
or device "manufactured, used, designated, developed, modified, licensed,
or procured - - (I) to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat, or cure a pandemic

or epidemic; or (II) to limit the harm such pandemic or epidemic might
otherwise cause."5 1 The broad language defining "covered
countermeasure" permits the Secretary to extend liability protection to
products not originally marketed as biodefense or pandemic
countermeasures.52 Again, the Secretary's determination as to whether a
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) ("I have met with each of the
manufacturers individually .... Each of those conversations have made clear to me that there are
three prerequisites to our success: The first is the liability component.").
45. Covered entities include the federal government and all participants involved in the
development, distribution, and administration of a covered countermeasure. Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(b)(2) (West Supp. 2007).
46. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
47. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1) (emphasis added). The Secretary's declaration must include: (1) the
categories of diseases, health conditions, or threats to health for which the Secretary recommends
the use of the countermeasure; (2) the periods during which the liability provisions will be in effect;
(3) the populations of individuals for which the liability provisions will be in effect; (4) the
geographic areas for which the liability provisions will be in effect; and (5) whether the liability
provisions will be effective only as to a particular means of distribution for obtaining the
countermeasure. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(2).
48. Id. § 247-6d(b)(7).
49. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(4). The Secretary may, however, amend the declaration to expand the
scope of the original declaration. Id.
50. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
51. Id § 247d-6d(i)(1)(A), (7)(A)(i).
52. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. S 14,242-01 (2005) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("There is nothing
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product will be designated a "covered countermeasure" is not subject to
judicial review.53
The expansive liability protection extended by PREPA significantly
limits an injured individual's ability to recover through the traditional tort
system. The protection applies to "any claim for loss that has a causal
relationship with the administration to or use by an individual of a covered
countermeasure."5 4 Covered losses include "any type of loss;"ss medical
monitoring; and property loss, including loss from business interruption.
Clearly, PREPA's sweeping immunity provisions "reveal[] a deep distrust
of tort law." 56
B. New FederalCause ofAction for "Willful Misconduct"
The "sole exception"57 to PREPA's sweeping immunity provisions is
an exclusive federal cause of action against a covered entity for death or
serious injury caused by "willful misconduct."58 "Willful misconduct" is
defined as "an act or omission that is taken -- (i) intentionally to achieve a
wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and
(iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it
highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit." 59 This definition
sets a standard of liability far more stringent than recklessness or any form

to prevent the declaration of immunity for say, Tylenol. There is nothing to prevent a declaration
that, say, arthritis is an epidemic."); Conk, supra note 16, at 230-31 ("PREPA authorizes an
unfettered Secretary of Health to immunize use in a declared emergency of any product that "may
mitigate" any disease or condition.") (emphasis added); Press Release, Office of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, Kennedy, Harkin and Dodd Protest Frist Liability Giveaway (Dec. 21, 2005),
http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press release.cfm?id=5 Idl 7ba8-b66b-486a-8fd9-d7 1fal0e8e
55 ("Senator Frist and other Republicans have variously called diabetes, obesity, methamphetamine
addiction, and arthritis "epidemics." Manufacturers of products for these common diseases and
symptoms, including Vioxx, could be given complete immunity protections under the bill.").
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(b)(7).
54. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Covered claims include all claims having "a
causal relationship with the design, development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture,
labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, donation,
dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use of such countermeasure." Id.
55. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Covered losses include death; physical, mental,
or emotional injury; fear of physical, mental, or emotional injury, including any need for medical
monitoring; and property loss, including loss from business interruption. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(A)(i)(iv).
56. Conk, supra note 16, at 230.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(d)(1). Notably, the immunity provisions will not apply if a
covered entity disobeys the Secretary's declaration. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(3). Thus, to receive immunity,
a covered entity must use the covered countermeasure only during the effective period of the
declaration and only for the categories of diseases, health conditions, or threats to health specified
in the declaration. Id. § 247d-6d(a)(3)(A)-(B).
58. Id. § 247d-6d(d)(1).
59. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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of negligence. 60 In addition, the Secretary is directed to "promulgate
regulations . . . thatfurther restrictthe scoPe of actions or omissions ...
that may qualify as "willful misconduct.""
Notably, PREPA provides a government compliance defense that
excludes from the definition of "willful misconduct" certain regulated
activities of covered entities. If an act or omission by a covered entity is
subject to regulation by PREPA or by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, then
such act or omission shall not constitute "willful misconduct" . . .
if-(i) neither the Secretary nor the Attorney General has initiated an
enforcement action with respect to such act or omission; or
(ii) such an enforcement action has been initiated and the action
has been terminated or finally resolved without a covered remedy.62
As a result, an individual may not bring a suit for "willful misconduct"
against a regulated covered entity unless the entity has been successfully
prosecuted by the government and been made subject to a "covered

remedy." 63
PREPA's "willful misconduct" exception is so narrowly drawn that few
claims will proceed to the traditional tort system. The exception is plainly
intended to protect pharmaceutical manufacturers and other covered
entities, few of which will meet PREPA's stringent culpability
requirements in the ordinary course of business.
C. Administrative Compensation Scheme
The final section of PREPA creates an administrative no-fault
compensation scheme intended to remedy injuries and deaths caused by
"covered countermeasures." Under the no-fault scheme, an injured
individual is not required to prove manufacturer fault or product defect to
receive administrative compensation from the government. Rather, an
injured individual need only establish that he or she sustained a "serious

60. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(B).
61. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5).
63. Id. § 247d-6d(c). A "covered remedy" is defined as "an outcome -- (I) that is a criminal
conviction, an injunction, or a condemnation, a civil monetary payment, a product recall, a repair or
replacement of a product, a termination of an exemption under section 505(i) or 520(g) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a debarment, an investigator disqualification, a revocation
of an authorization under section 564 of such Act, or a suspension or withdrawal of an approval or
clearance under chapter 5 of such Act or of a licensure under section 262 of this title; and (II) that
results from a final determination by a court or from a final agency action." Id. § 247d-6d(5)(B)(ii).
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physical injury"6 that was "directly caused by the administration or use of
a covered countermeasure."
The compensation available to eligible individualS 66 includes medical
benefits, 67 lost income benefits,6 8 and death benefits. 69 However, these
benefits are subject to significant limitations. The medical benefits
available under PREPA, for example, are secondary to all other
government and private sources of compensation.o
Moreover, lost income benefits under PREPA are limited to two-thirds
of the eligible individual's employment income.7 1 However, if the eligible
individual has one or more dependents, the rate increases to three-fourths
of the individual's employment income.72 If an eligible individual's
injuries are not permanently disabling, lost income benefits are further
limited to $50,000 per year7 and a lifetime total of $315,746 as of October
1, 2008. 74 If an eligible individual's injuries are permanently disabling, the
lifetime total does not apply,75 and the individual may recover up to
$50,000 per year until the individual reaches the age of sixty-five. Lost
64. Id. § 247d-6e(e)(3).
65. Id. § 247d-6e(b)(1). The Secretary has the exclusive authority to determine whether an
injured individual is eligible for compensation under PREPA. Id. § 247d-6e(b)(4). The Secretary's
eligibility determinations are not subject to judicial review. Id. § 247d-6e(b)(5)(C).
66. Id. § 247d-6e(b)(2). The type and amount of compensation available under PREPA is
generally the same as that available under the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of
2003 (SEPPA), which provides government compensation for injuries resulting from the
administration of certain countermeasures against smallpox. Id.
The compensation that shall be provided ... shall have the same elements, and
be in the same amount, as is prescribed in sections 239c, 239d, and 239e ofthis
title in the case of certain individuals injured as a result of administration of
certain countermeasures against smallpox, except that section 239e(a)(2)(B) of
this title shall not apply.
Id.
67. Id. § 239c.
68. Id. § 239d.
69. Id. § 239e.
70. Id. § 239c(b). Other government and private sources of compensation include Medicare,
state workers' compensation programs, and private insurance carriers. Id.
71. Id. § 239d(b)(1).
72. Id. § 239d(b)(2).
73. Id. § 239d(c)(3)(A)(i).
74. Id. § 239d(c)(3)(A)(ii); Bureau of Justice Assistance Public Safety Officers' Benefits
(PSOB) Program, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/ grant/psob/psob main.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2009). The lifetime total is equal to the amount of death benefits available to survivors of eligible
individuals under section 239e. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(3)(A)(ii). The amount of death benefits
available to survivors of eligible individuals under section 239e. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(3)(A)(ii).
The amount of death benefits available to survivors of eligible individuals under section 239e is
calculated under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program. Id. § 239e(a)(2)(A).
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(3)(B).
76. Id. § 239d(c)(5). Lost income benefits terminate for all eligible individuals, including
those subject to the lifetime total, when the eligible individual reaches the age of 65. Id.

210

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20

income benefits, like medical benefits, are secondary to all other
government and private benefits for lost income.7 7
Furthermore, lost income benefits are not available to survivors of a
deceased eligible individual if the survivors have begun to collect death
benefits under PREPA. Death benefits under PREPA are limited to a
single, lump-sum payment in the amount of $315,746 for eligible deaths
occurring on or after October 1, 2008.79 However, if the survivor of the
eligible individual is a minor, the minor's legal guardian may elect to forgo
the single, lump-sum payment and instead receive lost income benefits
until the deceased's youngest dependent reaches age 18.80
To provide such compensation, PREPA establishes an emerpency fund
designated as the "Covered Countermeasure Process Fund." 8 The fund
consists of "such amounts designated as emergency appropriations,"8 2 and
the Secretary is to provide compensation to eligible individuals "after
amounts have by law been provided for the Fund." Notably, PREPA does
not specify an amount to be appropriated to the fund. As a result, the fund
will not provide compensation to eligible individuals unless Congress
enacts a separate statute appropriating money to the fund.84
PREPA's no-fault compensation scheme strays from traditional tort
principles by providing "compensation without a wrong."85 Although the
77. Id. § 239d(c)(1)(A).
78. Id. § 239d(c)(2).
79. Id. §239e(a)(2)(A); Bureau of Justice Assistance Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB)
Program, supra note 74. Notably, death benefits payable to survivors will not be reduced by the
amount paid under PREPA in lost income benefits prior to the eligible individual's death. 42
U.S.C.A. § 239d(c)(3)(A)(ii). Section 239e(a)(2)(B), which states that any death benefits payable to
survivors under section 239(a)(2)(A) must be reduced by the amount paid under section 239d in lost
income benefits prior to the eligible individual's death, does not apply to PREPA's compensation
scheme. Id. §247d-6e(b)(2). Similarly, death benefits will not be reduced by any amount paid under
PREPA in medical benefits. Id. § 239e(c).
80. Id. § 239e(b)(3).
81. Id. § 247d-6e(a). The fund is established "for the purposes of providing timely, uniform,
and adequate compensation to eligible individuals for covered injuries directly caused by the
administration or use of a covered countermeasure pursuant to [a declaration by the Secretary of a
public health emergency]." Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 247d-6e(b)(1) (emphasis added).
84. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act Questions and Answers, http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/emergency/
manmadedisasters/ bioterorism/medication-vaccine-qa.html#flnt (last visited Mar. 19, 2009) ("If
funds are appropriated,compensation may then be available for medical benefits, lost wages and
death benefits to eligible individuals for specified injuries in accordance with regulations published
by the Secretary.") (emphasis added); see also Press Release, Office of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, supranote 52 (noting that PREPA does not appropriate money to the fund and that, as a
result, the fund will not provide compensation unless Congress subsequently takes actions to
appropriate money to the fund).
85. Conk, supra note 16, at 236 (noting the distinction between compensation offered to
individuals who have suffered a wrong and compensation offered as a benefit to those who assume
risk to advance a public purpose).
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no-fault scheme does increase the likelihood that injured individuals will
receive some compensation, PREPA's severely limited, unfunded
compensation scheme fails to provide adequate and fair compensation to
those who have been injured by a biodefense or pandemic countermeasure.

IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS

OF THE PUBLIC READINESS AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACT

It is clear that the pharmaceutical industry is unwilling to develop new
biodefense and pandemic countermeasures without some form of liability
protection from the federal government.8 7 PREPA's extensive liability
provisions are certain to encourage the development of needed vaccines
and other countermeasures. As previously discussed, once the Secretary
has issued a declaration under PREPA, a covered pharmaceutical
manufacturer will enjoy "near-total immunity"89 from civil liability. 90
Furthermore, the Secretary may not thereafter rescind or limit the immunity
previously extended. 9 1 However, PREPA is limited by two notable
shortcomings: its inadequate compensation scheme and its inability to
deter negligent conduct.
A. Inadequate Compensation
In adopting PREPA, Congress clearly intended to provide strong
liability protection to participants involved in the development,
distribution, and administration of biodefense and pandemic
86. See Greenberger,supra note 30, at 19.
87. See discussion supra Part II.
88. Indeed, the federal government has awarded several recent biodefense contracts. For
example, in June 2007, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services awarded a $500 million
contract to Bavarian Nordic A/S to manufacture and deliver twenty million doses of a next
generation modified vaccinia Ankara smallpox vaccine, indicated for people with weakened
immune systems. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS Buys Next
Generation Smallpox Vaccine (June 4, 2007). More recently, in September 2008, the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, part of the National Institutes of Health, and the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority awarded contracts to PharmAthene
and Emergent BioSolutions to develop a next generation anthrax vaccine. Press Release, Emergent
BioSolutions, Emergent BioSolutions Signs Contract with BARDA/NIAID, Valued at Up to $29.7
Million, to Fund Development ofAV7909 - A Next Generation Anthrax Vaccine (Sept. 12,2008);
Press Release, PharmAthene, PharmAthene Awarded NAID Contract for Up to $83.9 Million for
Third Generation rPA Anthrax Vaccine Program (Sept. 26, 2008). The contract awarded to
PharmAthene is worth $83.9 million. Press Release, PharmAthene, supra.The contract awarded to
Emergent BioSolutions is worth $29.7 million. Press Release, Emergent BioSolutions, supra.
89. Mello, supra note 29, at 32.
90. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
91. See Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d6d(b)(4) (West Supp. 2007); supra text accompanying note 49.
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countermeasures. However, Congress failed to give suitable consideration
to the inevitable counterpart to the liability problem, the need to provide
adequate compensation to those who have been injured by the
administration or use of such countermeasures.
The primary rationale for offering compensation to individuals injured
by a government-recommended vaccine or other countermeasure is to
encourage voluntary participation in preventative vaccination programs
and other emergency preparedness plans. 92 "The operating assumption here
is that some individuals will be willing to undergo vaccination if they
know that compensation for resulting injuries is easily obtainable through
an administrative program, but not if the only remedy is to file a lawsuit, or
if there is no remedy at all." 93 Compensation as a means of ensuring
participation is particularly important when the risk of a bioterrorist or
pandemic threat is low and the risk associated with using a recommended
countermeasure is high.94
A second rationale for offering compensation is based on principles of
fairness or moral obligation. 95 "Where vaccinations are legally mandatory,
or are effectively required in order for health workers or emergency
responders to fulfill their professional duties... , the government should
provide ready access to compensation for injuries that result."9 6
Vaccinations are mandated primarily to provide a net benefit to the
community, rather than to provide a net benefit to any individual.9 7
Furthermore, the burdens associated with mandated vaccination are unique
in that "they go be ond dignitary harms and economic losses to actual
physical injury[;]" 9 are statistically certain to occur; and will primarily
92. Mello, supra note 29, at 35. In the absence of mandatory vaccination laws, voluntary
participation is essential to achieve the public benefit of "herd immunity." See Conk, supranote 16,
at 234. "Herd immunity" describes "the principle that every person who is vaccinated aids the rest
of the community because she is no longer a source of disease replication and transmission." Id.
"Herd immunity . .. is achieved with less than 100% participation because certain persons are more
likely transmitters of disease, and therefore more important vaccinees than are others." Id. at 225.
93. Mello, supra note 29, at 35.
94 Greenberger, supra note 30, at 32 ("High vaccine risk coupled with low or ambiguous
threat of bioterrorist attack will cause prospective vaccinees to weigh heavily vaccine injury
compensation in their personal risk-benefit calculus."). But see Mello, supra note 29, at 35-36.
At present, there is little evidence to support the assumption that easy
availability of compensation increases willingness to undergo vaccination....
It may be that a perception of near-zero risk [of disease outbreak] is sufficient
[in and of itselfl to turn people against vaccination, but when the perceived risk
is higher, people may weigh a range of factors in making their decision.
Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Mello, supra note 29, at 41.
Id.
Id. at 35; see supra note 92.
Id. at 37.
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affect the most vulnerable of those vaccinated, namely children and the
elderly. 99 Thus, while "the social decisions to require vaccination and to
impose duties on certain individuals to care for others during emergencies
. . . are entirely justifiable ... justice requires that redress is made to those
who are so burdened, insofar as we can provide it.""o
Clearly, providing adequate compensation to those who have been
injured by biodefense or pandemic countermeasures ensures sound public
policy. Unfortunately, PREPA's sparse compensation scheme does little to
promote this policy.' 0 ' The benefits available under PREPA are hardly
generous. PREPA, for example, does not provide damages for pain and
suffering.102 Furthermore, the monetary caps on PREPA's lost income and
death benefits 0 3 are not sufficient to assure compensation commensurate
with an injured individual's current standard of living. 10 Certainly, both
policy rationales discussed above support the argument that
"[c]ompensation should .

.

. restore injured vaccines to their pre-injury

positions.*"' 0 5
Another significant point of concern is PREPA's severe statute of
limitations, which bars claims for compensation filed later than one year
after the date of administration of a covered countermeasure.106 According
to the Institute of Medicine, in many cases a vaccine-related injury will not
99. Id. In addition, because vaccines are generally administered to healthy people, adverse
reactions to vaccines are "far more noticeable and less tolerated" by persons receiving the vaccine.
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 26, at 106.

100. Mello, supra note 29, at 41-42.
101. As previously mentioned, PREPA adopts the compensation scheme of SEPPA. See supra
text accompanying note 66. Notably, the inadequate compensation program established under
SEPPA is often cited as a leading cause of the ultimate failure of the federal smallpox vaccination
program launched in 2003. See, e.g., Greenberger,supra note 30, at 8; Michael H. LeRoy, Pox
Americana? VaccinatingMore EmergencyDoctorsfor Smallpox: A Law and Economics Approach
to Work Conditions, 54 EMORY L.J. 597, 604 (2005); Holly Meyers et al., The ThreatofSmallpox:
Eradicatedbut not Erased; A Review ofthe Fiscal,Logistical,andLegal Obstacles Impactingthe
Phase I Vaccination Program, J. HOMELAND SEC., Feb. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/gursky smallpox.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2009).
102. George W. Conk, Reactions and Overreactions:Smallpox Vaccination,Complications,
and Compensation, 14 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REv. 439, 496 (2003) (discussing SEPPA and, by
extension, PREPA).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 71-80.
104. Greenberger, supra note 30, at 34 (discussing SEPPA and, by extension, PREPA). This is
particularly true in the case of a high wage earner. Id. For example, "a seriously injured, but not
permanently disabled, first responder such as an emergency room doctor who hypothetically made
$100,000 per year could see his or her annual salary halved, and that salary would last for only [six]
years - an especially troublesome prospect if the doctor had a young family." Meyers et al., supra
note 102 (discussing SEPPA, and, by extension, PREPA).
105. Greenberger, supra note 30, at 34.
106. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 239a(d)(1)
(West Supp. 2007); Conk, supranote 103, at 497 (discussing SEPPA and, by extension, PREPA
and identifying the statute of limitations as one of the "most troubling aspects" of the compensation
scheme).
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become apparent until more than one year after the administration of the
vaccine.' As a result, many individuals injured by covered products may
be left without even an administrative remedy.'08
Finally, an overarching problem to PREPA's parsimonious
compensation scheme is that PREPA's provisions are subject to
appropriations.' 09 This condition "giv[es] Congress the opportunity to
change the program's parameters, if appropriate under the circumstances
then prevailing, prior to the expenditure of federal taxpayer funds.""o
Presently, Congress has yet to appropriate a single dollar to PREPA's
compensation fund."' As a result, the fund is unable to provide
compensation.11 2 Certainly, the argument can be made that
"precommitments by government programs . . . reduce the ability of
government . . . to allocate resources to meet the most pressing needs

after an attack.""13 However, history has shown that a fair and
adequate compensation scheme must be firmly in place prior to the
implementation of a preventative vaccination program to ensure the
program's success." 4
PREPA's inadequate compensation scheme likely reflects the concern
that prior federal liability and compensation programs have proven to be
too costly."15 However, the federal government has stressed that
107. Conk, supra note 103, at 497.
108. See id. (discussing SEPPA and, by extension, PREPA).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
110. Paul Taylor, We're All in This Together: Extending Sovereign Immunity to Encourage
PrivateParties to Reduce Public Risk, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1595, 1643 (2007).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
112. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
113. Taylor, supra note 111, at 1643 (quoting LLOYD DIxoN & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN,
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ArrACKS 143 (2004); see also 151 CONG. REC. H12,244-

03 (2005) (statement of Rep. Deal).
Those who argue we are deficient because we have not yet put money in the
compensation fund don't get it. You really can't do that until there is a reason
to do so. If there is no pandemic flu, there will be no reason for a vaccine to be
administered. Right now there is no need for any compensation funding at all.
Id.
114. Greenberger, supra note 30, at 10, 32 (discussing the ultimate failure of the federal
smallpox vaccination program of 2003 and concluding that "a full liability and compensation
scheme should be in place before any 'pre-emptive' vaccination program begins" to ensure the
program's success) (emphasis in original); see also ARTHUR M. SILVERSTEIN, PURE POLITICS AND
IMPURE SCIENCE: THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR 142 (1981) (providing a thorough analysis of the National

Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 and concluding that all aspects of the complex liability
problem must be solved in advance).
115. Meyers et al., supra note 102. For example, the National Swine Flu Immunization
program of 1976 did not place limits on the amount of compensation available for injuries resulting
from the swine flu vaccine. Id. As a result, the government eventually paid out ninety million
dollars in damages for injuries resulting from a vaccination program lasting less than six months.
David Brown, A Shot in the Dark: Swine Flu's Vaccine Lessons, WASH. POST, May 27,2002, at A9.
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vaccinations and other preemptive countermeasures are an integral part of
the nation's biodefense strategy." 6 Therefore, liability and compensation
programs for biodefense countermeasures "are not where the government
should be attempting to 'save' funds."" 7 Simply put, "providing liability
protection andadequate compensation for biodefense vaccinations is part
of the cost of doing business."' 18
B. InadequateDeterrence
A second notable shortcoming of PREPA is its inability to deter
negligent conduct. By thoroughly insulating pharmaceutical manufacturers
from virtually all threats of civil liability, PREPA fails to provide adequate
assurance that covered manufacturers will take optimal precautions in
testing and developing their products.'19
Traditional tort law encourages acceptable patterns of social behavior
by requiring that the party responsible for causing a wrongful injury bear
the cost of the injury. 120 Ideally, "[b]y imposing the threat of liability on
tortious conduct, the law can discourage parties from engaging in that
conduct."'21 In the context of biodefense and pandemic product
development, "tort law deters industry negligence and deception and
encourages disclosure and innovation to improve product safety." 22
Conversely, if industry actors "know they are immune from lawsuits, they
In addition, under the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Compensation Program (NCVICP) of
1986, which remains in effect today, lost income benefits are awarded in an amount equivalent to
"actual and anticipated loss ofearnings." Greenberger, supranote 30, at 20. In the first twenty years
of the program's existence, the NCVICP has paid out almost 1.9 billion dollars for 2,284 awards in
administrative claims and attorneys' fees. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health
Resources and Services Administration, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Statistic
Reports, http://www.hrsa.gov/Vaccinecompensation/statisticsreport.htm#post_1 (last visited Mar.
27, 2009).
116. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003);
Roundtable Discussion, supra note 31, at 3 (statement of Sen. Enzi, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions); Weiss, supra note 4.
117. Greenberger, supra note 30, at 35.
118. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
119. Conk, supra note 16, at 228.
120. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation: FDA
Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 2313, 2314 (2008); see also Conk, supra
note 16, at 257 ("Determination of liability in tort is a valuable measure and means of achieving
civility in civil society.").
121. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of TortLaw: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 381 (1994).
122. Gostin, supranote 121, at 2315. "State tort law provides a system of civil justice designed
to . . . deter unreasonably hazardous conduct[] and encourage innovation in product design,
packaging, labeling, and advertising." Id. at 2314. "Common law failure-to-warn claims, for
example, create incentives for companies to revise their labels in light ofrisks that were unknown at
the time of approval or risks that are greater than originally thought, thereby alerting physicians and
patients to potential hazards." Id. at 2315.
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may be less likely to conscientiously monitor a product's safety, disclose
health hazards, and promptly recall hazardous devices from the market."l 23
In this sense, tort law may be viewed as a "tool of public health," helping
to prevent injurious industry behavior and to provide incentives for safer

products.124
PREPA, however, shields covered entities from traditional tort
principles in all instances except those involving "willful misconduct." 25
The "willful misconduct" standard is so narrowly drawn 26 that it is
unlikely to have any significant deterrent effect.12 This is true as few
pharmaceutical manufacturers are likely to commit such egregious
misconduct while engaging in their usual course of business.128
Furthermore, PREPA provides liability protection to covered entities
"without any requirement that reasonable care have been used in the
development and manufacture of the product . . . [or] that
manufacturers . . . continue to study or work to improve the product"

after liability protection has been extended.129 Even when a significant
period of time has elapsed between the Secretary's declaration and the
actual use by the public of the covered countermeasure, the manufacturer
has no duty to further research or test the covered product.130 This is of
particular concern given that many products covered by PREPA will be
developed without the usual battery of tests and FDA approval that nonemergency, commercial drugs would have to endure.13' Thus, PREPA fails
to ensure that the industry will take reasonable steps to guarantee the safety
of biodefense and pandemic products.132 Instead, PREPA creates a great
risk of shielding a broad range of negligent and reckless conduct. 133
Certainly, "[t]he threat posed by a serious pandemic or bioterrorism
requires that society recalibrate the balance between plaintiff rights and
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2314.
125. See supra text accompanying note 58.
126. See discussion supra Part III.B.
127. See Conk, supra note 16, at 229 (noting that "one would have to be a very bad actor" to
meet the "willful misconduct" standard).
128. See RoundtableDiscussion,supra note 31, at 17 (statement ofJohn M. Clerici, McKenna,
Long, and Aldrige) ("[C]ompanies are more than happy to accept that sort of exception to any sort
of liability regime, because ... the responsible company is not going to be willfully negligent or
commit gross misconduct."); see also 151 CONG. REc. S 14242-01 (2005) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(noting that the liability standard of "willful misconduct" coupled with the requirement that such
conduct be established by "clear and convincing evidence" essentially requires an injured party to
prove that the pharmaceutical manufacturer committed a crime).
129. Conk, supra note 16, at 228.
130. Id. at 232.
131. RoundtableDiscussion,supranote 31, at 10 (statement of David P. Wright, President and
Chief Executive Officer, PharmAthene); see supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
132. See Conk, supra note 16, at 232.
133. Id. "Manufacturing defects, design defects, inadequate warnings, and even reckless
disregard of safety by manufacturers are thus all immunized by PREPA." Id. at 228.

2009]

THE COST OFA COUNTERMEASURE:

THE EXPANSIVE LIABILITY PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC

217

public safety." 34 Even so, the federal government need not "gratuitously
insure" pharmaceutical manufacturers for their own negligent conduct.'
Rather, the government must devise some form of deterrence mechanism
to ensure optimal industry behavior.' 36 One such mechanism would allow
the government to seek indemnification from negligent or reckless
manufacturers covered by PREPA. 3 1 Another such mechanism would
simply lower the "willful misconduct" standard to allow private causes of
action against negligent or reckless manufacturers. 138 Allowing such
actions, however, would lead to private enforcement through the traditional
tort system, an avenue Congress specifically sought to avoid by enacting
PREPA.' 3 9 Regardless of the avenue the government ultimately chooses to
pursue, it is imperative that the government enhance the deterrence
component of PREPA.
In sum, while PREPA creates critical liability protection for the
pharmaceutical industry, its evident shortcomings do little to promote
sound public policy. Therefore, Congress should modify PREPA by
creating a compensation system that is more generous to victims and by
devising a deterrence mechanism that ensures the development of safe
biodefense and pandemic products. The cost of reconsidering and
implementing a successful liability and compensation program prior to a
public health emergency "is a relatively small price to pay when compared
to what the price would likely be at the post-event stage." 4 0 Thus, to
ensure a successful biodefense strategy, Congress should reconsider
134. Dirk Olin, Op-Ed, A Shot at Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2005, at A31.
135. Roundtable Discussion: When Terror Strikes-Preparingan Effective andImmediate
Public Health Response: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, 109th Cong. (Errata) 7 (2005) (statement of George W. Conk, adjunct professor Fordham
Law School).
136. See id.
Why should the United States, if it chooses to assume such a burden as insurer,
do so without fee? And why, in any event, should it limit its right to recover
from its suppliers to instances of breach of contract or gross misconduct? Why
should the United States - if it chooses to compensate citizens for the wrongful
conduct of independent contractors - not retain the right of recovery from
those whose negligence or defective products caused injury?
Id.
137. See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 30, at 12 (discussing the National Swine Flu
Immunization Program of 1976, which did include such a provision).
138. See, e.g., Conk, supra note 16, at 232-33 (discussing a proposed repeal of PREPA, titled
the "Responsible Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act").
139. See supra Part II.
140. Greenberger, supra note 30, at 36. "At the pre-event stage, the population targeted for
vaccination is manageable and the risks of receiving the vaccination are calculable. In contrast, once
an outbreak occurs, the cost of confronting the catastrophic consequences that emerge grows
exponentially - especially without the benefit of vaccinated first responders." Id.
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PREPA's shortcomings while the threat of a bioterrorist attack or
pandemic influenza is still theoretical.
V. CONCLUSION
Since PREPA's enactment in 2005, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services has issued eight declarations and five amendments.' 4 ' The first
declaration was issued on January 26, 2007 for the H5N1 vaccine to
protect against the avian influenza virus. 142 More recently, on October 1,
2008, former HHS Secretary Michael 0. Leavitt issued a declaration under
PREPA that "provides liability protection for activities related to
developing, manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, dispensing,
administering and using anthrax countermeasures in preparation for, and in
response to, a potential anthrax attack."l 43 In conjunction with the
declaration, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development
Authority within HHS asked the FDA to authorize eligible mail carriers to
receive kits containing small quantities of antibiotics for personal use
following an anthrax attack.'"
Notably, in announcinF these actions, HHS stressed that "no imminent
threat currently exists."' 4 Rather, the related actions are part of a larger
emergency preparedness plan. By distributing anthrax countermeasures to
postal workers in advance of a public health emergency, HHS hopes to
"protect volunteers against contracting anthrax if, following an outdoor
anthrax attack, the Postal Service was called upon to deliver the same lifesaving antibiotics directly to homes across their community where people
may have been exposed to the bacterium that causes anthrax." 4 6
The most recent PREPA declarations have been issued in response to
human infections with a newly discovered swine influenza A (swine flu)
virus. 147 As recently as September 28, 2009, HHS Secretary Kathleen
141. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act General Information,
http://ww.hhs.gov/disasters/discussion/planners/prepact/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
142. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary, Pandemic
Countermeasures; Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 72
Fed. Reg. 4710 (Feb. 1, 2007).
143. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS Announces New Steps in
Anthrax Preparedness (Oct. 1, 2008) (available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2008pres/10/
20081001a.html).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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